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Abstract Integration of primary and secondary devices are
impelled by the development of smart grid. Based on the
ideology of primary and secondary device integration, an
all-in-one device and its concept, configuration and func-
tion are proposed. Then, an all-in-one device framework of
distributed substation area protection is proposed. Point-to-
point model and virtual local area network (VLAN) based
network-to-network model are adopted in this framework.
The dual redundancy on hardware and software level is
realized by modularization and protection information
mirroring storage/overwriting. Considering the fact that the
sampling, logic judgment and information sharing pro-
cesses of protection may fail in atrocious conditions, a
distributed cooperative all-in-one device cluster based
substation area joint defensive protection strategy is
proposed. The adaptability of sectional component failure
in secondary system is strengthened by reusing module
function, setting value mirroring storage and dynamic load
balancing computing ability to constitute strong intelligent
outdoor secondary device integrated network. Finally, the
simulation examples based on EPOCHS which consider
various system failure conditions are presented to verify
the validity and rationality of the proposed architecture and
strategy.
Keywords All-in-one device, Substation area protection,
Distributed cooperation, Protection overwrite, Joint
defensive protection
1 Introduction
Integration of primary and secondary device is an
important development direction of smart grid in the future
[1, 2]. By packing the sensing measurement, logic com-
puting and communication cooperation ability of sec-
ondary intelligent unit into primary devices with the
support of fiber, self-organizing substation interactive
protection and control network system can be realized [3].
According to the principle of modular design, the tradi-
tional substation secondary system construction process
can be simplified and the assembly errors that may occur in
the construction process can be remarkably reduced [4],
which gives the substation integrated solution an incom-
parable advantage to reshape the existing market of
equipment manufacturing.
If the previous scheme designs of substation area pro-
tection and wide area protection are adopted directly to
address the need, there will be lots of problems in suit-
ability and reliability. Mounts of previous works focused
on substation protection. A novel reliability modeling and
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analysis methodology were proposed in [5] for modern
substation protection systems. An integrated control and
protection system are proposed in [6] with a hierarchical
coordination control strategy. In [7], a substation backup
protection scheme based on multiple limitedly overlapped
divisions was proposed. In general, the integrated protec-
tion or the substation area protection usually acts as back-
up protection of substation, especially in high voltage
systems. However, the reliability of this type of structure is
still in doubt, related technologies and strategies cannot
directly apply to such a design that integrates the primary
equipment and secondary device into an entity. Although
seldom adopted in substation area protection, the dis-
tributed protection mode is widely accepted in the field of
wide area protection. In [8], a study of communication was
presented based on wide area agents for primary and
backup coordinated protection. A multi-agent based adap-
tive wide area current differential protection system was
proposed in [9]. In [10], a faulted element identification
algorithm was proposed based on multisource information
fusion for wide area protection. A novel wide area backup
protection algorithm was presented in [11] using informa-
tion shared across wide area communication networks. In
[12], a multi-agent system based wide area protection and
control scheme was proposed to deal with the long-term
voltage instability induced cascading trips. The researches
on distributed protection are valuable for the integration of
primary or secondary devices and for that an agent or a
distributed unit works in the same way in the wide area or
the substation area. However, the intelligent secondary
devices designed to be placed in substation master control
room cannot well match the life span of primary devices.
Besides, their adaptation for strong electromagnetic inter-
ference and atrocious operation environment is yet to be
testified [13]. Therefore, there are lots of problems in
feasibility and reliability of the integration of primary
device and secondary device in the same equipment.
Accounting for the running environment of primary and
secondary device integration, the conception of all-in-one
device and a distributed centralized protection structure are
proposed to deal with those problems from the aspects of
the topology, hardware and software design. The secondary
devices originally planned to be installed in the primary
device are now separated into different functional sec-
ondary device clusters into equipment cabinets with
favorable environment according to their geographical
locations and are designed based on modular structure. Its
configuration and function are described in detail. Then,
the virtual local area network (VLAN) networking
scheme based on secondary all-in-one device cluster is
proposed. To solve the problem of reliability, protection
unit failure is dealt with using adjacent back-up protection
which will extend trip range [14–16], all-in-one device
based substation area joint defensive protection strategy is
proposed in this paper. Moreover, the general-purpose
computing (GPC) module protection switching mechanism
is analyzed. The adaptability of sectional component fail-
ure in secondary system is strengthened by reusing module
function. The proposed joint defensive protection strategy
is particularly analyzed in various fault conditions. Finally,
the feasibility and advantage of the protection defense
strategy with the support of high speed Ethernet are testi-
fied by EPOCHS based joint simulation example.
2 All-in-one device
The internal structure of the all-in-one device is shown
in Fig. 1. Each device is equipped with one CPU and
several GPCs, CPU is responsible for task scheduling and
monitoring while the GPCs act just the same as co-pro-
cessors. The device can collect voltage and current mea-
surement in the primary side as well as switch signals, such
as the position nodes of breakers and disconnectors. It can
make full use of its own processor to realize the fast pro-
tection in the form of local measuring and local tripping.
Besides, the all-in-one device can provide comprehensive
information on this side of the cross-bay protection in the
substation. One or a plurality of all-in-one devices can
quickly make up the cross-bay protection using commu-
nication network within the station, such as transformer
differential protection, bus differential protection and so
on.
Compared with the traditional devices, the proposed
device is designed with hardware self-redundancy and
communicating module. Moreover, the setting value of the
traditional protection is only stored by the device itself,
without setting-value mirroring storage which managed by
system. However, this function can be fulfilled in the
proposed designed. The all-in-one device conforms to the
advantage of such design as integrating primary and sec-
ondary devices into an entity. Then, the compact structure
of local layer can be realized. Meanwhile, the function of
the bay level is still retained. And cross-bay protection
based on all-in-one device does not require concrete pro-














Fig. 1 Inner structure of all-in-one device
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the secondary equipment. The proposed topological struc-
ture based on all-in-one device applies equally to primary
and secondary device integration. Meanwhile, it avoids the
adaptation for strong electromagnetic interference and
atrocious operation environment to some degree.
2.1 SAV collecting module
All-in-one device can collect real-time data, mainly
including voltage, current and breaker status from other
sampling devices and preprocess the collected data through
general protection principle. Then it organizes the data in a
certain format and then sends the frame to the data bus of
the all-in-one device.
2.2 Communicating module
By the communication network, all-in-one device shares
the area fault information and receives the tripping decision
to cut off the fault. All-in-one device needs the commu-
nication capacity of high margin, high communication
speed and powerful information processing capability to
support hierarchical processing and real-time throughput
for the huge amount of information from both inside and
outside the station. It can provide quick and reliable
responses and cooperate with other devices.
2.3 GPC module
GPC is an independent plug-in module which can read
the necessary electrical information, according to the
mapping relationship of the program, within Ethernet to
identify faults. All-in-one device obtains fault information
of protection area and identifies the fault with the inte-
grated decision recognition algorithm. When the identifi-
cation result is uncertain, it starts a new round of
negotiation and takes fault-tolerant measures to identify
faulty components.
2.4 Setting-value mirroring storage
The SCD file format of the substation’s protection set-
ting-value mirror is shown in Fig. 2. The describing part of
the protection IED includes two parts. The first part is the
protection setting-value information of the original device.
The other part is the setting-value overwriting information
which comes into operation in the lack of information
when fault occurs. In the latter fault scenario, SCD analysis
module is responsible for extracting the setting-value
description information of the replaced protection unit at
the distal end and the pre-designed protection logic algo-
rithm to deal with different faults from files. Through
building a proprietary protection overwriting virtual
network, the information can be imported into the local all-
in-one device to realize alternative protection and improve
the reliability of the station protection.
3 Distributed cooperative substation area
protection system
3.1 System structure
The structure of distributed cooperative substation area
protection system is shown in Fig. 3. Based on all-in-one
devices, the system structure divides the substation into
several parts. Some bays are supervised by a single device
so that the total number of secondary devices can be
reduced. The protection and control functions are achieved
directly by the distributed installed all-in-one devices, thus
forming a protection system based on the all-in-one device
in the substation layer. Distributed devices cluster improve
the reliability of protection, the cancellation of main con-
trol room reduce the land occupied.
Considering that the substation is generally operating
under bus splitting mode, and single all-in-one device can
centrally supervise more than one bay. The area (or number
of bays) to be supervised by a single all-in-one device
should be determined following the criteria below.
Head message Substationmessage Protection 1 IED
Communication
description
Head message Substationmessage Protection 2 IED
Communication
description
Head message Substationmessage Protection 3 IED
Communication
description































































Fig. 3 Joint defensive structure of substation area protection
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1) The computing ability and hardware scale of all-in-one
devices.
2) The bays geographically being close should be super-
vised by same device.
3) The arrangement of the main and back-up protection
in a single bay.
4) The reliability of all-in-one device.
All-in-one device can not only realize the fast protection
of single bay, but also provide comprehensive information
on this side of the cross-bay protection in the substation.
Taking the hardware redundancy into account, 6–10
modules are required for each bay. At this stage, the
number of small plug-in type industrial control equipment
can be compatible with 2–4 bays. However, it is only an
approximate estimate based on the existing integrated
degree of hardware and the reliability of device. Along
with the progress of electronic technology and communi-
cation technology, the area to be supervised by a single all-
in-one device will further be improved.
Thus it needs a plurality of all-in-one devices to work
together in order to constitute the bus protection, as shown
in Fig. 3. The all-in-one device1 is in charge of the low-
voltage side of the transformer. The all-in-one device2 is in
charge of the outlet lines L1 and L2. The all-in-one device3
is in charge of the outlet lines L4 and L5. The protection of
bus 1 is cooperatively formed by device1, 2, 3. Generally,
the bays geographically close are supervised by a same
device.
3.2 VLAN network scheme
The achievement of the function of distributed cooper-
ative substation area protection system depends on a strong
communication framework, which ensures that the infor-
mation can be quickly and correctly transferred. Thus the
communication requirements can be met by constructing a
VLAN. VLAN is built on LAN switches, it divides LAN
equipment from the logical partition (not physically) into
several segments (smaller LAN), to realize data commu-
nication of internal virtual work group. The network
formed by VLAN can shield the public network structure
and encrypt the data, which turns the whole network into
an internal network on logic. The VLAN can offer an
economy, safe, flexible and comfortable information
communication solution for all-in-one devices.
By combining the scope partition of the substation
protection, the VLAN networking scheme within the sub-
station can be formed, as shown in Fig. 4. The VLAN
partition mode based on port is adopted. According to the
actual demand, a port can be divided into different VLAN.
The all-in-one devices constituting the same sectionalized
bus protection can communicate rapidly via the VLAN,
thus achieving the isolation from the information of other
sectionalized buses. The all-in-one devices of different
sectionalized buses can transmit information through the
distributed substation area communication network.
3.3 Overwriting mechanism of faulty GPC
An all-in-one device generally equips with several
GPCs, as seen in Fig. 5. When all protection logic algo-
rithm need to be realized, part of the GPCs are at work
(solid line), and the others act as backup (dotted line).
Assuming that there is a GPC failure (shading), it needs
to call the mirror to overwrite the backup GPC according to
the following steps:
1) Locate the backup GPC by topology searching and
give priority to overwriting the GPC of the same
device, thus achieving the switchover within the
device. This is shown by message1 in Fig. 5. When
all the backup GPCs of the same device have been in




















































Fig. 5 Overwriting mechanism of faulty GPC
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adjacent device is inevitable. This is shown by
message2 in Fig. 5.
2) Locate themirror of the fail-to-work protectionmodule,
which behaves as a certain GPC, and overwrite this
specified GPC with above located mirror.
3) Cancel the original record of the corresponding
protection and broadcast in LAN, update software
and hardware list of existing protection and acquire
I/O permissions.
After the steps above, the transfer of protection software
between different hardware can be achieved. Essentially,
another VLAN network has been added after the physical
address of the protection is changed. Therefore, VLAN
domain is required to be redefined in accordance with the
changes in the communication topology.
3.4 Overwriting mechanism of sampling value loss
Unlike GPC, an all-in-one device equips with one SAV
collecting module. Therefore, it’s necessary to design a
novel overwriting mechanism when sampling value is
missing. Supposing that there is an all-in-one device failure
with sampling value loss, the overwriting mechanism is
different when the device is in different topologies. On the
one hand, if the adjacent devices can constitute a closed
loop, it will overwrite a differential protection algorithm to
the adjacent devices through the private protection over-
written virtual network; on the other hand, if the adjacent
devices cannot constitute a closed loop, it will degrade the
protection of the superior devices. For instance, replace the
original differential protection by the overcurrent protec-
tion as the bus protection.
4 Joint defensive protection strategy
4.1 Description of distributed cooperative groups
The all-in-one device can obtain and process a large
number of concurrent information comprehensively in real
time and are endowed with communication channel with
other devices via VLAN network in the substation. If one
protection device fails in harsh outside environment in all
aspects of sampling, logic judgment, communication, the
surviving device can form cooperative group and tem-
porarily replaced the work of faulty device initiatively by
overwriting vacant calculation module from mirroring
storage. With the joint defensive protection system con-
stituted by a plurality of all-in-one devices, the flexible
scheduling and normal device of the secondary system can
be ensured while the reliability of which cannot be influ-
enced by small scale indeterminate faults.
4.2 Achievement of joint defensive protection
4.2.1 Normal device
To ensure the efficiency of data transmission and avoid
network congestion in emergency conditions that a torrent
of SAV data pouring into network, VLAN mode is intro-
duced to the process of system integration that all-in-one
device can only share information via VLAN with the ones
that involved in the same bus segment protection. For
example, the Bus 1 protection is formed by device1 to
device3. They share information via VLAN 1. However,
Buses 1, 2, 3 are in no need to exchange information under
normal circumstances.
Each device can obtain the information of the other
devices via VLAN and participate in the protection cal-
culation. To ensure the accuracy and reliability of judg-
ment, the weighted three select two strategy is adopted.
The expression 2
3
ðn1k1 þ n2k2Þ is the weighed sum of
devices making the final judgment; n1 is the number of
devices that supervises the bus inlet line; n2 is the number
of devices that doesn’t supervise the bus inlet line; k1 and
k2 are weighted coefficients ðk1[ k2Þ which are adopted to
weight the importance of different bay; [X] is the integer
part of X. The final judgments depend on the devices
computing faster, there is no need to wait for the judgments
of all the device. Taking Bus 1 as example, set n1¼ 1,
n2¼ 2, k1¼ 2, k2¼ 1, then 23 ðn1k1 þ n2k2Þ ¼ 2, the final
judgments of Bus 1 is shown in Table 1. The proposed
strategy is also applicable to other protection in substations,
its description will not be repeated here.
4.2.2 Failure of GPC
By virtue of the configuration features of GPC, the
overwriting mechanism is the same when the faulty device
is in different topologies. If the GPC of all-in-one device1
fails, it can load remote mirroring protection of the faulty
GPC and overwrite the backup GPC in the same device by
private virtual network. Furthermore, if all the backup
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Note: ‘‘1’’ means fault
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GPCs are overwritten with new protection, it needs to be
replaced in the adjacent ones, such as the GPCs in all-in-
one devices 2 and 3.
4.2.3 Failure of SAV collecting module
With regard to the configuration features of SAV col-
lecting module, the overwriting mechanism is different
when the faulty device is in different topologies.
1) If the SAV collecting module of all-in-one device5 is
failed, as a result, the Bus 2 differential protection will
not be able to continue to play a proper role.
Meanwhile, the adjacent devices (devices 4 and 6)
cannot form a closed loop without device5, as shown
in Fig. 3. Under this circumstance, the strategy to
overwriting superior breaker b8 by VLAN network
would be a proper choice. It should be noted that the
more sensitive overcurrent protection of b9 and b10 is
used to overwrite b8. Moreover, the cooperation of b8,
b11, b12, and b13 should be synthetically considered.
Firstly, the corresponding device sends a blocking
message to the b8 as long as an overcurrent is detected
by b11, b12, or b13, delaying 0.5 s. Secondly, if b11,
b12 or b13 did not detect an overcurrent and zone I
protection of b8 act, it should remove all the breakers
that connected to the bus immediately; if zone I
overcurrent protection of b8 did not act and zone II, III
act, b9 and b10 should be disconnected.
2) If the sampling value of b8 is invalid, thus the Bus2
differential protection will be out of work. However,
the adjacent breakers b6, b7, b9, b10, b11, b12, b13,
b14 can still constitute a closed loop, as shown in
Unable to constitute a closed loop
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Fig. 8 Substation power system and communication structure
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Tripping the corresponding breakers
Choosing overwriting mechanism
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Fig. 7 Substation area joint defensive protection strategy process
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Fig. 3. Therefore, it will overwrite a differential
protection algorithm to the adjacent devices.
4.2.4 Joint defensive protection strategy based on all-in-
one devices
The all-in-one devices can realize the joint defensive
protection through cooperation, even though, parts of them
are out of work. The secondary system is still able to
quickly respond to various kinds of faults, forming a strong
secondary integration network. The whole process is
shown in Fig. 7.
According to Fig. 3, a comprehensive protection over-
writing mechanism is proposed in order to overcome
sampling value loss, as shown in Fig. 6. However, this kind
of strategy can only be used temporarily as an emergency


















Fig. 9 Influence of VLAN on Ethernet delay













(a) b3 local measurement action signal and
cooperation decision signal













(b) b8 corresponding line current waveform
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t (s)
Fig. 10 Line protection under normal circumstance






















(a) Differential and restrain current of device4 and 6












































(b) Current waveform of lines connect to faulty bus
-0.5
Fig. 11 Bus protection with faulty GPC
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5 Simulation tests and analysis
Based on the EPOCHS synchronous simulation platform
of power grid and communication system, the system
simulation model of the 110 kV substation is established,
as shown in Fig. 8. In the model, there are three 50/50 MW
transformers. 10 kV side bus uses segment connection and
segment breaker is switch on. Each all-in-one device
controls 2 to 4 sampling points/breakers, distributed
according to the location of the primary device and
accessed into 100 M bandwidth of station communication
network. The breaker action time is set to 50 ms. By the
simulation experiments on NS2, the solid line represents
the end-to-end delay of the same bus segment is
0.02*0.04 ms via VLAN, as shown in Fig. 9, such as from
device1 to device2 via VLAN 1 in Fig. 8. The dotted line
represents the far end-to-end delay of the different bus
segment is 0.1*0.12 ms, such as from device1 to device5
via substation LAN in Fig. 8. The simulation results show
that the VLAN can significantly reduce the network delay.
5.1 Normal device
Scenario 1: A ground fault occurs on the end of L2 is
simulated, overcurrent protection zone I of b3 did not trip,
while zone II, III did. Meanwhile, all-in-one device2
receives the message that the overcurrent protection of b2,
b4, b5 did not trip. Then, substation area protection is
adopted to locate the fault. Correspondingly, it will
accelerate the overcurrent protection zone II trips as long as
the fault occurs on L2, without delaying 0.5 s for the zone
II of traditional protection, as shown in Fig. 10.
5.2 Failure of GPC
Scenario 2: A ground fault occurs on Bus 2 is simulated.
Meanwhile, a GPC fault occurs on all-in-one device5. The
weighted three select two strategy is adopted. When a fault
occurs on GPC of device5, the judgments of device4 and 6
are shown in Fig. 11a, the current waveform of the lines
connect to faulty bus is shown in Fig. 11b. The response
speed of protection is similar to the sound device.
5.3 Failure of SAV collecting module
Assuming that the SAV collecting module of all-in-one
device5 is fault. As a result, the sampling values of b9 and
b10 are missing, as shown in Fig. 8.
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Fig. 13 L5 failure while b9 and b10 sampling value miss
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Scenario 3: A ground fault occurs on Bus 2 at t = 0.2 s is
simulated. Meanwhile, a sampling fault occurs on all-in-
one device5, and all-in-one device4 finish overwriting. If
zones I, II and III overcurrent protections of b8 act and the
overcurrent protections of b11, b12, b13 have not acted, by
means of the proposed strategy in Fig. 6, the local action
signal and trip command of b8 are shown in Fig. 12a.
Current waveforms for lines that connected to faulty bus
are shown in Fig. 12b.
Scenario 4: A ground fault occurs on L5 at t = 0.2 s is
simulated. Meanwhile, a sampling fault occurs on all-in-
one device5, and all-in-one device4 finish overwriting. As
shown in Fig. 13, zone I overcurrent protection of b8 did
not act and zones II and III act. In addition, b11, b12 and
b13 have not detected overcurrent. On this occasion, b9
and b10 should be disconnected immediately.
Scenario 5: A ground fault occurs on L7 at t = 0.2 s is
simulated. Meanwhile, a sampling fault occurs on all-in-
one device5, and all-in-one device4 finish overwriting. As
seen in Fig. 14, zones I, II and III overcurrent protections
of b8 acted. In addition, zones I, II and III of b11 also
acted. Under this circumstance, b11 sends a block signal to
b8, and segment I overcurrent protection of b8 sends a trip
signal.
1
(a) b11 local measuring action signal and tripping command
(b) b8 local measuring action signal
(c) b11 corresponding line current waveform











0 0.1 0.2 0.3 0.4 0.5 0.6 0.7 0.8
t (s)


































































































(a) Original differential loop
(b) Expanding differential loop
Fig. 15 Bus segment2 failure while b8 sampling value miss
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Scenario 6: A ground fault occurs on Bus 2 at t = 0.2 s is
simulated. Meanwhile, the sampling value of b8 was
missing, and devices finish overwriting. As seen in Fig. 15.
The bus differential protection and transformer protection
that consisted of b8 are blocked at first, then two small
differential protection fuses to a large one. Obviously, the
large differential protection could protect Bus 2 and the
transformer.
6 Conclusions
This paper absorbs the advantage of hot backup in infor-
mation field. Then, an all-in-one device based distributed
substation area protection framework is proposed. Point-to-
point model andVLANbased network-to networkmodel are
adopted in this framework. Dual redundancy on hardware
and software level is realized by modularization, protection
informationmirroring storage and overwriting, which avoids
the risk of single point failure of internal components
effectively.On this basis, a distributed cooperative all-in-one
device cluster based substation area joint defensive protec-
tion strategy is proposed. The proposed strategy can over-
come the sampling, logic judgment and information
transmission processes of protection may be mistaken by the
atrocious conditions, and form a strong intelligent secondary
device integrated network. EPOCHS based simulation
examples verify the validity and rationality of the proposed
architecture and strategy. If the secondary device is provided
with adequate environmental reliability, the research of this
paper will provide an excellent foundation for integration of
primary and secondary device.
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